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Writing Objective: Write an 8-10 page research paper on a topic significance for International Politics.

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In 1974, studies by American scientists revealed that chloroflourocarbons, or CFCs, damage the ozone layer. According to the first of two theories published that year, a single chlorine atom was capable of eliminating tens of thousands of ozone molecules. The second theory stated that man-made CFCs would break down in the presence of radiation In the stratosphere and release dangerously large quantities of chlorine. These hypotheses were “environmental bombshells.” CFC production had soared from 150,000 metric tons in 1960 to over 800,000 metric tons in 1974.

Theories about the relationship between the ozone layer, chlorine, and CFCs “stimulated tremendous activity in scientific and industrial circles” (Benedick 1989, 44). Three of the most important steps taken in response to this threat resulted from the efforts of scientists, industrialists, and most importantly, delegates sent by their respective countries to address this problem. Together, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol, and critical revisions to the Montreal Protocol three years later, mark a very significant upward step in international politics. This paper will focus on describing the events that led to their adoption, as well as the events that took place during the negotiations. Richard Elliot Benedick, an ambassador and diplomat of ozone negotiations, proved to be the biggest source of information during the research, and is documented often throughout the paper.

CFCs have a wide variety of uses. As they are chemically stable and vaporize at low temperatures, they make excellent coolants in refrigerators and air-conditioners, and are ideal as propellant gases in spray cans. They are also good insulators, standard ingredients in the manufacture of styrofoam, and generally inexpensive to produce. The stability of CFCs means that they aren’t chemically destroyed or rained out quickly in the lower atmosphere, like other man-made gases. Instead, they slowly migrate upward, where they remain intact for decades (Benedick 1989, 44).

The discovery in 1974 that CFCs might deplete the ozone layer triggered a swift reaction in the U.S. Sales of aerosol sprays, then the dominant use of CFCs, dropped sharply. Congress added ozone protection amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1977, and one year later the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration banned all “nonessential” CFC aerosols, cutting aerosol use of CFCs by more than 90 percent (Doniger 1988, 87). Following this action, the U.S. urged the European Community (EC), the world’s largest producer and exporter of CFCs, to follow this policy. Without the EC’s participation, a partial CFC ban would not be effective, and would also lead to a competitive edge by the EC because it would still be able to use the cheap CFCs instead of the more expensive substitutes (Jachtenfuchs 1990, 263). However, the EC showed “scant interest in CFCs” and delayed until 1980 to enact even a 30 percent cutback in CFC aerosol use from 1976 levels (Benedick 1989, 45).

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has been essentially responsible for forging an international consensus on the ozone depletion issue. The establishment of UNEP followed the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in June of 1972, and was specifically designed to stimulate environmental awareness. After a successful decade of sponsoring projects and cooperative ventures, UNEP organized the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer In Vienna in March 1985 (Wexler 1990, 6). Forty-three nations, including sixteen developing countries, met to complete work on the ozone convention. An Ad Hoc Working Group had been meeting for three years in order to prepare a framework convention and draft all the elements of a protocol, with the crucial exception of the control provisions (Benedick 1991, 44).

This conference was “in itself a striking accomplishment” even though it did not achieve its original goal of a draft protocol (this was due to the large discrepancy between the U.S. proposal for a total international aerosol ban and the EEC recommendation for only a 30 percent reduction) [Wexler 1990, 6-71. It produced a treaty, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and more importantly, “it marked the first time in history that the international community adopted anticipatory safeguards to an environmental threat” (Wexler 1990, 7).

Though it contained no substantive provisions, the Convention adopted in Vienna was combined with the resolutions from the Conference to create a framework for the Montreal Protocol. For example, the Convention included a resolution to convene a series of international workshops on both short and long term strategies that sought to fairly control global production, emissions, and uses of CFCs. It took into account the particular situation of developing countries and updated scientific and economic research (Wexler 1990, 7). The Convention also imposed obligations on signatories to exchange research, cooperate in the formulation of standards, and adopt domestic legal or administrative measures to protect human health and the environment from ozone-depleting chemicals (Nanda 1989, 500).

A final resolution, introduced at the last moment of the Conference by the United States and its allies, was distinct from the convention itself. This resolution authorized UNEP to “reopen diplomatic negotiations with a 1987 target for arriving at a legally binding protocol.” Further, it provided that before the formal negotiations began, UNEP would “convene a workshop to develop a more common understanding of factors affecting the ozone layer,” including costs and effects of possible control measures (Benedick 1991, 45). The European industry opposed this initiative, and many other governments were “at best unenthusiastic.” This resolution proved to be the springboard for the Montreal Protocol, and was carried with the help of some countries in the EC—Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands—and with pressure from Mostafa Tolba, UNEP’s executive director, who was able to encourage and gather support from developing nations (Benedick)

On September 16, 1987, 24 states signed the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which expanded the purpose of the Vienna Convention. The Montreal Protocol held that it was the state’s obligation “to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.” This position that action must be taken to halt the continuance of ozone destruction was strengthened by the recognition of scientific uncertainty, reflected in the phrases “likely to result” and “likely to modify.” This helped to establish the present state of scientific knowledge as the basis for such an action, and allowed sufficient flexibility to change if dictated by future scientific data (Nanda 1989, 502).

Formal negotiations for the Protocol began in December 1986, by which time governments had already divided into three separate camps. The EC, following the European industry line, mirrored the views of the UK, France, and Italy. They advocated the kind of production capacity cap they had favored during the meetings preceding the Vienna Convention. In 1983 a proposal was made by the U.S., Canada, the Nordic nations, and Switzerland, which suggested a worldwide ban on nonessential uses of CFCs in spray cans, pointing out that the U.S. and others had already demonstrated that alternatives to CFC sprays “were technically and economically feasible” (Benedick 1989, 47). The EC countered with a proposal in late 1984 for alternative controls that would prohibit new additions to CFC production capacity (Benedick 1989, 48). Therefore, each side was backing a protocol that would require no new controls for itself but considerable adjustment for the other—the U.S. was operating at close to capacity, whereas the Europeans had the capacity to expand CFC production rates for another 20 years before hitting the cap (Benedick 1989, 48).

Also, because scientific models showed that there would be at least two decades before any significant ozone depletion would occur, EC negotiators felt that there was time to delay production cuts and wait for more evidence. This perspective was initially shared by the USSR and Japan (Benedick 1989, 48). In opposition to this view were the U.S., Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and New Zealand, who all favored stronger new controls. They argued that action needed to be taken well before critical levels of chlorine accumulated, because the process of ozone depletion “could not be suddenly turned off like a faucet”—these compounds have long atmospheric lifetimes and thus depletion inevitably stems from both past and current production. These countries felt that the health and environmental risks of delay needed to be promptly addressed and that a postponement of meaningful action “could necessitate draconian and thus costlier measures later on” (Benedick 1989, 48). The third group of active participants included Austria, Australia, and a number of Third World countries. Initially, these countries were uncommitted, but as the arguments developed they moved toward favoring more, rather than less, stringent regulations (Benedick 1989, 48). Complicating the entire negotiation process was the fact that the EC had to achieve International consensus among its 12 member governments. This consensus was made difficult by the deep divisions within the EC on the ozone issue. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands were increasingly disposed toward strong CFC controls, though Germany was the only major producer of the four. The UK, France, and Italy were all large producers and resisted every step of the way. The remaining five EC members— Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Luxembourg — did not even participate in most of the negotiations (Benedick 1989, 48). An important factor in the progress of protocol negotiations occurred in January of 1987 after Belgium replaced the UK in the EC presidency, which automatically rotates every six months. When the presidency rotated again in Jury 1987, the “troika” (past, present and future presidents) included Belgium, Denmark, and Germany, who all favored stringent controls. Benedick feels that it was probably this constellation, in the right place at the right time, that ultimately influenced EC acceptance of “considerably stronger measures than it had previously endorsed” (Benedick 1989. 48).

One of the most important and difficult issues to resolve during the Montreal Protocol negotiations was whether restrictions should be placed on the production or consumption of the substances covered by the agreement. The EC pushed for controls on production, arguing that it would be simpler to control output since there were only a small number of producing countries, whereas there were countless consuming industries and points of consumption. On the other side was the U.S., Canada, and others who feared that controlling production would give the EC unusual advantages. Therefore, they favored the consumption-related formula. Since the EC exports about one-third of their output and since there were no other exporters in the picture, the EC would have a virtual monopoly on the CFC market because there are no viable competitors. However, if the European domestic consumption should rise, the EC could cut back its exports, leaving the current importing countries without a supplier. This would give those countries a strong incentive to remain outside the treaty and build their own CFC facilities (Benedick 1989, 49).

The United States and its allies, recognizing the EC’s valid argument about controlling multiple consumption points, came up with an “ingenious solution: A limit would be placed on production plus imports minus exports to other Protocol signatories” (Benedick 1989, 49). This eliminated any monopoly based on current export positions because the producing countries could raise their production for exports to protocol parties without having to cut their own domestic consumption. Therefore, only exports to nonparties would have to come out of a country’s domestic consumption (Benedick 1989, 49).

The EC and the U.S. were again principal opponents on the single most contentious issue: the timing and extent of reductions. Originally, the U.S. called for a freeze to be followed by three phases of progressively more stringent reductions, all the way up to a 95% cut. However, the EC was reluctant to consider reductions beyond 10 to 20 percent The U.S., Germany, and others rejected this as Inadequate. The turning point came when Mostafa Tolba began to play a central role in the negotiations. He personally proposed a freeze by 1990, followed by successive 20% reductions every two years down to a complete phaseout. Ultimately, all the parties agreed to a 50% decrease. The treaty as signed stipulated “an initial 20% reduction from the 1986 level of CFCs, followed by 30%. Halons [another group of ozone-destroying chemicals] were frozen at 1986 levels, pending further research.” An innovative provision was added so that these reductions were to be made on specific dates regardless of when the treaty should enter Into force. This removed any temptation to stall the enactment of the protocol in the hopes of delaying cuts, as well as providing industry with dates upon which to base its planning (Benedick 1989, 49).

Finally, encouraging developing countries to participate in the treaty was yet another difficult task faced by Protocol negotiators. The per capita consumption of CFCs in these countries was tiny in comparison to that of the industrialized world, but their domestic consumption requirements were growing, and CFC technology is relatively easy to obtain. Therefore, the Protocol had to meet their needs during a transition period while substitutes were being developed, and also discourage them from becoming major new sources of CFC emissions (Benedick 1989, 49). Negotiators developed a formula that permitted a 10-year grace period for developing countries, before they had to comply with the control provisions. During this time they are allowed to increase their consumption up to an annual level of 0.3 kg per capita, which is approximately one-third of the 1986 level for Industrialized countries (Benedick 1989, 50).

The third important step was taken in June of 1990 when delegations from governments, international institutions, and private-sector organizations convened in London to consider and decide upon significant revisions of the 1987 Montreal Protocol. By that time, 58 governments plus the EC, who represented 99% of estimated world production and 90% of consumption, had ratified or agreed to the protocol. Of these, 30 parties were from industrialized countries, and 28 were from developing countries. Brazil had recently joined, and now attention was focused on China and India, who had not yet joined (Benedick 1991, 163).

Executive Director Mostafa Tolba, a month before the June 20 scheduled beginning, circulated for consideration a personal proposal for revisions of the protocol’s control measures. He offered this four-page document/proposal in an attempt to promote greater consensus on the measures. The seven elements up for regulation in the proposal included CFCs, new CFCs, halons, “other halons,” carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and hydrochloroflourocarbons. A promising action by the EC was its statement that a 50% reduction in CFCs by 1991-92, 85% by 1995-96, and 100% by 1997 or at the latest before 2000, would be “reasonable and realistic” objectives for the London Conference (Benedick 1991, 163-164).

The task at London was more formidable and more complex than the one that was faced just three years earlier in Montreal. Now represented In the working group were more than 80 governments and about 30 nongovernmental organizations, and still more would attend the meeting of parties. There were new agendas and new actors who represented not only environment and foreign affairs, but also finance, aid, planning, and development ministries. Alliances among countries shifted depending on the issues, and different delegations assumed leading roles on different subjects (Benedick 1991, 167).

In sum, after the London revisions the Montreal Protocol contained five groups of controlled substances: the original five CFCs and three halons, plus ten new CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform (a popular industrial solvent not previously recognized as a major source of stratospheric chlorine). These were now all scheduled for varying interim reductions and phaseouts In 10 to 15 years, and contained clear Indications that even these schedules could be accelerated on the basis of early reassessments (Benedick 1991, 176). Tolba proclaimed on the night of June 29 that the London negotiations had not merely strengthened a treaty, but had written “a new chapter in the history of international relations” (Benedick 1991, 196).

After extensive reading on this matter, I am amazed at the incredible amount of negotiating that took place. My original Impression was that there were just three events—the Vienna Conference and the meetings in Montreal and London—and lots of “blank” periods in between. However, it was more of a continuous process. There were meetings and negotiations taking place throughout those critical years. It seems that these negotiations represented more of a “what’s the best deal I can get for my country” attitude rather than “what’s the best thing I can do to help prevent ozone destruction.” It’s infuriating that people will still put their own personal Interests, or those of their country’s, ahead of those of the rest of the world. I know that discovering and implementing ozone substitutes will be costly, but what will be a thousand times more costly are the medical bills and insurance costs that will arise from increased cases of cataracts and cancer, not to mention the severe alteration of the world’s food chain, and ultimately the extinction of all living beings on earth.

Another aspect that angers me is the laxness of the restrictions. Scientists have proved that the ozone layer is diminishing and there is even an ozone “hole” over Antarctica. That means that all chemicals that destroy the ozone should be completely banned. Earth’s population will not die out from lack of refrigeration and industrial solvents. We will adjust and find alternatives. The fact that a provision exists in the Protocol that will allow parties to continue construction on facilities that produce controlled substances (so that their initial investment is not lost) is completely ridiculous (Nanda 1989, 505). Our ideal purpose is to get rid of ozone-destroying substances, and we are allowing the construction of facilities that produce them—there is absolutely no logic in that. I realize that the negotiating process is extremely difficult and that there are lots of factors involved, but we are losing sight of our goal. We are producing substances that destroy the ozone layer, and its destruction will eventually destroy us. There is no room for anything less than a complete ban on these substances that promote such a dire and appalling destruction.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the Montreal Protocol was a first-of-its-kind protocol that was based not on proven scientific facts, but rather on probable causes—that CFCs are related to ozone depletion, though not necessarily the cause. It also illustrates the possibility that nation-states can take cooperative action to address global environmental problems of “perceived urgency,” even though initial sources of opposition revolve around the uncertainty of inaction and the costs of corrective measures (Feldman 1991, 47). As president of the London Conference, U.K environment secretary Chris Patten concluded that the Montreal Protocol and its process would become “the model for…future environmental diplomacy” (Benedick 1991, 198).

Works Cited

Benedick, Richard Elliot “Ozone Diplomacy.” Issues in Science and Technology Fall 1989: 43-50.

Benedick, Richard Elliot Ozone Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Doniger, David D. “Politics of the Ozone Layer.” Issues in Science and Technology Spring 1988: 86-91.

Feldman, David L. and Dean Mann. “Policy Analysis and the Management of Climate Change.” Policy Studies Journal Spring 1991: 43-49.

Jachtenfuchs, Markus. “The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer.” Journal of Common Market Studies March 1990: 261-277.

Makhljani, Arjun, et al. “Still Working on the Hole.” Technology Review May/June 1990: 53-59.

Morrisette. Peter M. “The Montreal Protocol: Lessons for Formulating Policies for Global Warming.” Policy Studies Journal Spring 1991: 152-161.

Nanda. Ved P. “Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Challenge for International Environmental Law and Policy.” Michigan Journal of International Law Spring 1989: 482-525.

Rowland, F. Sherwood. “Can We Close the Ozone Hole?” Technology Review August/September 1987: 50-58.

Wexler, Pamela. “Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Beyond the Montreal Protocol.” Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade Vol. 14, 1990: 119.